利用Windbg分析Magicodes.IE一次錯誤編寫導致記憶體劇增
阿新 • • 發佈：2021-12-13
由於這近一年時間一直忙於寫書和工作，一直沒有水文，但是近期有幾位朋友使用我們的Magicodes.IE反饋在匯出過程中記憶體暴漲...好吧，不管怎樣，不能苦了我們朋友，接下來我們通過windbg來看一下什麼原因導致的。
接下來我們先通過address -summary來看一下當前應用記憶體佔用量。
0:000> !address -summary --- Usage Summary ---------------- RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal Free 581 7df8`ef0c9000 ( 125.972 TB) 98.42% <unknown> 1678 206`ffb9e000 ( 2.027 TB) 99.99% 1.58% Image 950 0`064fd000 ( 100.988 MB) 0.00% 0.00% Heap 58 0`050f6000 ( 80.961 MB) 0.00% 0.00% Stack 156 0`04380000 ( 67.500 MB) 0.00% 0.00% Other 11 0`019ad000 ( 25.676 MB) 0.00% 0.00% TEB 52 0`00068000 ( 416.000 kB) 0.00% 0.00% PEB 1 0`00001000 ( 4.000 kB) 0.00% 0.00% --- Type Summary (for busy) ------ RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal MEM_MAPPED 282 200`038a6000 ( 2.000 TB) 98.64% 1.56% MEM_PRIVATE 1674 7`07184000 ( 28.111 GB) 1.35% 0.02% MEM_IMAGE 950 0`064fd000 ( 100.988 MB) 0.00% 0.00% --- State Summary ---------------- RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal MEM_FREE 581 7df8`ef0c9000 ( 125.972 TB) 98.42% MEM_RESERVE 295 205`f8659000 ( 2.023 TB) 99.79% 1.58% MEM_COMMIT 2611 1`188ce000 ( 4.384 GB) 0.21% 0.00% --- Protect Summary (for commit) - RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal PAGE_READWRITE 1595 1`0dc6c000 ( 4.215 GB) 0.20% 0.00% PAGE_EXECUTE_READ 156 0`04d66000 ( 77.398 MB) 0.00% 0.00% PAGE_READONLY 600 0`03851000 ( 56.316 MB) 0.00% 0.00% PAGE_NOACCESS 99 0`021f2000 ( 33.945 MB) 0.00% 0.00% PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 19 0`0027b000 ( 2.480 MB) 0.00% 0.00% PAGE_WRITECOPY 90 0`001a0000 ( 1.625 MB) 0.00% 0.00% PAGE_READWRITE | PAGE_GUARD 52 0`0009e000 ( 632.000 kB) 0.00% 0.00% --- Largest Region by Usage ----------- Base Address -------- Region Size ---------- Free 189`0413c000 7c6b`01ed4000 ( 124.418 TB) <unknown> 7dfb`2a153000 1f9`bd2ef000 ( 1.976 TB) Image 7ffc`883c1000 0`009ba000 ( 9.727 MB) Heap 183`0e9a1000 0`00f01000 ( 15.004 MB) Stack 37`62980000 0`0017b000 ( 1.480 MB) Other 183`77707000 0`01775000 ( 23.457 MB) TEB 37`62600000 0`00002000 ( 8.000 kB) PEB 37`627dd000 0`00001000 ( 4.000 kB)
MEM_COMMIT佔用了4.384G，接下來我們利用eeheap -gc來檢查託管堆。
0:000> !eeheap -gc
GC Allocated Heap Size: Size: 0x11ac2568 (296494440) bytes.
GC Committed Heap Size: Size: 0x120e7000 (302936064) bytes.
根據這些記憶體來看，似乎問題不是這裡，大量的記憶體還是出現在非託管。我們利用Windows NT堆來看一下，其實在Windows中大多數的使用者堆分配器都在ntdll.dll中的NT堆管理器API（RtlAllocateHeap/RtlFreeHeap）上建立，比如說C中的malloc/free和new/delete，另外還有COM框架中的SysAllocString以及在Win32中的LocalAlloc、GlobalAlloc和HeapAlloc，雖然說這些分配器都會建立不同的堆來儲存它們的記憶體，但是他們最終都要呼叫ntdll.dll中的NT堆來實現。
0:000> !heap -s ************************************************************************************************************************ NT HEAP STATS BELOW ************************************************************************************************************************ NtGlobalFlag enables following debugging aids for new heaps: stack back traces LFH Key : 0x7cfd4cc2db4ddb4d Termination on corruption : ENABLED Heap Flags Reserv Commit Virt Free List UCR Virt Lock Fast (k) (k) (k) (k) length blocks cont. heap ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0000018378fd0000 08000002 65128 15296 64928 1720 177 17 2 c LFH External fragmentation 11 % (177 free blocks) 00000183775c0000 08008000 64 4 64 2 1 1 0 0 000001837aa90000 08001002 1280 108 1080 26 3 2 0 0 LFH 000001837ad20000 08001002 60 8 60 2 1 1 0 0 000001837aca0000 08041002 60 8 60 5 1 1 0 0 000001887bfd0000 08001002 60 20 60 1 2 1 0 0 000001830cf30000 08001002 3324 1364 3124 19 10 3 0 0 LFH 000001830ce30000 08001002 60 8 60 5 1 1 0 0 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
輸出結果如上所示，NT堆內容好少....什麼原因....好吧根據 maoni所說，似乎是驗證出了問題。
GC沒有管轄這些記憶體，所以說還是我們編寫的程式碼有問題，我們返過來再考慮一個事情，“匯出進行時，記憶體會大量增加，匯出完成後記憶體會降低下去”。我們來看一下程式碼，如下所示，其實我們現在明白的是，在我們執行期間肯定是這些記憶體一直“持有”，並沒有被釋放掉。
app.MapGet("/excel", async content =>
{
string path = Path.Combine(Directory.GetCurrentDirectory(), "test.xlsx");
List<TestDto> list = new();
for (int i = 0; i < 400; i++)
{
list.Add(new TestDto
{
ImageUrl = "https://gimg2.baidu.com/image_search/src=http%3A%2F%2Fup.enterdesk.com%2Fedpic_source%2F53%2F0a%2Fda%2F530adad966630fce548cd408237ff200.jpg&refer=http%3A%2F%2Fup.enterdesk.com&app=2002&size=f9999,10000&q=a80&n=0&g=0n&fmt=jpeg?sec=1641193100&t=417a589da8c9ba3103ed74c33fbd6c70"
});
}
Stopwatch stopwatch = Stopwatch.StartNew();
ExcelExporter exporter = new ExcelExporter();
await exporter.Export(path, list);
stopwatch.Stop();
await content.Response.WriteAsync(stopwatch.Elapsed.TotalSeconds.ToString());
});
根據記憶體的表現和我們的理論，我們繼續利用windbg來排查一下，現在其實我們可以發現，這些物件最終還是被GC收回了，帶著理論我們繼續構思，GC是知道哪些物件可以終結的對吧？並且它們在變成不可到達時呼叫它們的終結器，在GC中會利用finalization queue來記錄這些終結物件。所以說我們是不是可以查一下？如下所示，我們來看一下。
0:000> !finalizequeue
----------------------------------
Statistics for all finalizable objects (including all objects ready for finalization):
MT Count TotalSize Class Name
00007ffc2dc23818 1 24 System.Net.Security.SafeCredentialReference
00007ffc2dac4238 1 24 System.WeakReference
00007ffc2d6eb908 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.KestrelServerOptions, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
00007ffc2d6e4120 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Runtime.Loader.AssemblyLoadContext, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d572b68 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.ServiceProvider, Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection]]
00007ffc2d429258 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[System.IO.FileSystemWatcher, System.IO.FileSystem.Watcher]]
00007ffc2dd15c20 1 32 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeBCryptAlgorithmHandle
00007ffc2d6de4d8 1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeLocalAllocHandle
00007ffc2d68fa00 1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertStoreHandle
00007ffc2d3a5cc0 1 32 System.Net.Quic.Implementations.MsQuic.Internal.SafeMsQuicRegistrationHandle
00007ffc2db390c8 1 40 Interop+WinHttp+SafeWinHttpHandle
00007ffc2d69a420 1 40 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertContextHandle
00007ffc2d5bea18 1 40 System.Diagnostics.EventLog
00007ffc2dc29a38 1 48 System.Net.Security.SafeFreeCredential_SECURITY
00007ffc2d963f80 2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Text.RegularExpressions.RegexReplacement, System.Text.RegularExpressions]]
00007ffc2d7a3750 2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelConnection, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
00007ffc2d685e10 1 56 System.Runtime.CompilerServices.ConditionalWeakTable`2+Container[[System.Buffers.TlsOverPerCoreLockedStacksArrayPool`1+ThreadLocalArray[[System.Char, System.Private.CoreLib]][], System.Private.CoreLib],[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d44c4d0 1 56 System.Runtime.CompilerServices.ConditionalWeakTable`2+Container[[System.Buffers.TlsOverPerCoreLockedStacksArrayPool`1+ThreadLocalArray[[System.Byte, System.Private.CoreLib]][], System.Private.CoreLib],[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d96be68 1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Uri, System.Private.Uri]]
00007ffc2d96b780 1 64 FlagCellStore
00007ffc2d96af48 1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d96a5b8 1 64 CellStore`1[[OfficeOpenXml.ExcelCoreValue, Magicodes.IE.EPPlus]]
00007ffc2d6ddab8 2 64 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeChainEngineHandle
00007ffc2d69d528 2 64 Internal.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle
00007ffc2d685bc8 2 64 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeWaitHandle
00007ffc2d685280 3 72 System.Threading.ThreadInt64PersistentCounter+ThreadLocalNodeFinalizationHelper
00007ffc2d5f5f50 3 72 System.Runtime.InteropServices.PosixSignalRegistration
00007ffc2d4299d0 1 72 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeFileHandle
00007ffc2d6e40b8 1 80 System.Runtime.Loader.DefaultAssemblyLoadContext
00007ffc2dac9ed0 2 96 PageIndex
00007ffc2d96d0c8 2 96 ColumnIndex
00007ffc2d464470 3 120 System.Gen2GcCallback
00007ffc2d40a620 1 120 System.IO.FileSystemWatcher
00007ffc2d96bc18 2 128 CellStore`1[[System.Int32, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2dac20c8 2 144 System.Reflection.Emit.DynamicResolver
00007ffc2d680f10 3 144 System.Threading.LowLevelLock
00007ffc2d683c48 3 168 System.Threading.ThreadPoolWorkQueueThreadLocals
00007ffc2d681e80 1 176 System.Threading.LowLevelLifoSemaphore
00007ffc2dc25ef0 1 184 System.Collections.Concurrent.CDSCollectionETWBCLProvider
00007ffc2db8e658 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2db8c378 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2db38f90 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2d90c658 1 184 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStreamManager+Events
00007ffc2d689b48 1 184 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Certificates.Generation.CertificateManager+CertificateManagerEventSource
00007ffc2d66f9f8 1 184 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.FrameworkEventSource
00007ffc2d66b720 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2d44d128 1 184 System.Buffers.ArrayPoolEventSource
00007ffc2d2e2ec8 1 184 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.NativeRuntimeEventSource
00007ffc2d694e10 1 192 System.Threading.Tasks.TplEventSource
00007ffc2d572ab0 1 192 Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.DependencyInjectionEventSource
00007ffc2d505f00 1 200 Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.EventSource.LoggingEventSource
00007ffc2db8ade8 1 224 System.Net.NameResolutionTelemetry
00007ffc2d428b08 7 224 System.Threading.PreAllocatedOverlapped
00007ffc2d563c78 1 232 System.Diagnostics.DiagnosticSourceEventSource
00007ffc2d61fe88 1 240 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting.HostingEventSource
00007ffc2db6b788 8 256 System.Threading.TimerQueue+AppDomainTimerSafeHandle
00007ffc2d690270 1 280 System.Net.Sockets.SocketsTelemetry
00007ffc2db6bc80 1 296 System.Net.Http.HttpTelemetry
00007ffc2d68b998 1 336 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelEventSource
00007ffc2dc21998 1 360 System.Net.Security.NetSecurityTelemetry
00007ffc2d2dae28 1 384 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.RuntimeEventSource
00007ffc2d66ad60 10 480 System.Net.Sockets.SafeSocketHandle
00007ffc2d2e0240 21 504 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventSource, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d2b0538 9 648 System.Threading.Thread
00007ffc2d77a188 2 704 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Sockets.Internal.SocketReceiver
00007ffc2d90cec0 6 960 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStream
00007ffc2d5fc658 10 1280 System.Net.Sockets.Socket
00007ffc2d68d898 4 1536 System.Net.Sockets.Socket+AwaitableSocketAsyncEventArgs
00007ffc2d2dc778 42 4704 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventSource+OverrideEventProvider
00007ffc2daec058 356 14240 System.Drawing.Bitmap
Total 553 objects
WOW！！！，看上面356個System.Drawing.Bitmap在等待回收，看起來這是我們的影響因素，我們來查一下程式碼。
try
{
cell.Value = string.Empty;
Bitmap bitmap;
if (url.IsBase64StringValid())
{
bitmap = url.Base64StringToBitmap();
}
else
{
bitmap = Extension.GetBitmapByUrl(url);
}
if (bitmap == null)
{
cell.Value = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Alt;
}
else
{
ExcelPicture pic = CurrentExcelWorksheet.Drawings.AddPicture(Guid.NewGuid().ToString(), bitmap);
AddImage((rowIndex + (ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex > 1 ? ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex : 0)),
colIndex - ignoreCount, pic, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.YOffset, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.XOffset);
CurrentExcelWorksheet.Row(rowIndex + 1).Height = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height;
pic.SetSize(ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Width * 7, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height);
}
}
catch (Exception)
{
cell.Value = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Alt;
}
在ExcelPicture物件中去使用Bitmap物件，對於線上圖片源來說，我們會讀取並存儲到Bitmap中，但是我們發現並沒有對該物件進行釋放操作，所以導致大量的Bitmap一直沒有釋放，我們通過using來處理一下。
using (ExcelPicture pic = CurrentExcelWorksheet.Drawings.AddPicture(Guid.NewGuid().ToString(), bitmap))
{
AddImage((rowIndex + (ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex > 1 ? ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex : 0)),
colIndex - ignoreCount, pic, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.YOffset, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.XOffset);
CurrentExcelWorksheet.Row(rowIndex + 1).Height = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height;
pic.SetSize(ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Width * 7, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height);
}
一個帶有終結器的新物件是必須要被新增進finalization queue中的，這個行為也被稱為“終結註冊（registering for finalization）”。
當然我也建議你選擇使用SOSEX擴充套件外掛，它提供了finalization類似的內容，似乎看起來更直觀一些，如下所示。
下載地址：http://www.stevestechspot.com/default.aspx
:000> .load D:\sosex_64\sosex.dll
This dump has no SOSEX heap index.
The heap index makes searching for references and roots much faster.
To create a heap index, run !bhi
0:000> !finq -stat
Generation 0:
Count Total Size Type
---------------------------------------------------------
54 2160 System.Drawing.Bitmap
54 objects, 2,160 bytes
Generation 1:
Count Total Size Type
---------------------------------------------------------
1 184 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Certificates.Generation.CertificateManager+CertificateManagerEventSource
1 336 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelEventSource
4 1536 System.Net.Sockets.Socket+AwaitableSocketAsyncEventArgs
1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertStoreHandle
1 280 System.Net.Sockets.SocketsTelemetry
1 192 System.Threading.Tasks.TplEventSource
1 40 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertContextHandle
2 64 Internal.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle
2 64 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeChainEngineHandle
1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeLocalAllocHandle
1 80 System.Runtime.Loader.DefaultAssemblyLoadContext
1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Runtime.Loader.AssemblyLoadContext, System.Private.CoreLib]]
1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.KestrelServerOptions, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
2 704 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Sockets.Internal.SocketReceiver
2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelConnection, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
1 184 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStreamManager+Events
6 960 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStream
2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Text.RegularExpressions.RegexReplacement, System.Text.RegularExpressions]]
1 64 CellStore`1[[OfficeOpenXml.ExcelCoreValue, Magicodes.IE.EPPlus]]
1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
1 64 FlagCellStore
2 128 CellStore`1[[System.Int32, System.Private.CoreLib]]
1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Uri, System.Private.Uri]]
2 96 ColumnIndex
2 144 System.Reflection.Emit.DynamicResolver
1 24 System.WeakReference
2 96 PageIndex
302 12080 System.Drawing.Bitmap
1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
1 40 Interop+WinHttp+SafeWinHttpHandle
8 256 System.Threading.TimerQueue+AppDomainTimerSafeHandle
1 296 System.Net.Http.HttpTelemetry
1 224 System.Net.NameResolutionTelemetry
1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
1 360 System.Net.Security.NetSecurityTelemetry
1 24 System.Net.Security.SafeCredentialReference
1 184 System.Collections.Concurrent.CDSCollectionETWBCLProvider
1 48 System.Net.Security.SafeFreeCredential_SECURITY
1 32 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeBCryptAlgorithmHandle
499 objects, 30,736 bytes
Generation 2:
0 objects, 0 bytes
TOTAL: 553 objects, 32,896 bytes
可能大家都會像我一開始有個疑問，你這個圖片我看了...沒有那麼大，並且在windbg中也沒有表現大小呀。首先我們先來看一下這個圖片的質量。
圖片的畫素為2560x1440，位深為24目前已知這些資訊，我們計算一下未壓縮的圖片大小。
2560x1440x24/8
10M左右一張圖，已知圖片數x10M=3G，其實對於這個問題來說，這並不屬於記憶體洩漏。