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阿新 • • 發佈：2018-08-13
med lock 計劃 purchase 量子 home 計算 實力 set
users and a flourishing community of start-ups and innovative companies.
最近出現的針鋒相對的貿易行動，可能會加劇美國和中國對科技主導地位所展開的全球爭奪。
中國的互聯網用戶人數全球最多，而且創業和創新企業群體蓬勃發展。
The Trump administration this week accused Beijing of stealing valuable technological know-how
Chinese investments. China responded with its own set of penalties aimed at American products.
本周，特朗普政府在提議對價值 600 億美元（約合 3800 億元人民幣）的中國商品征收關稅並
限制中國的投資時，指責北京從美國公司竊取寶貴的核心技術。中國做出反擊，針對美國產品
也拿出了一系列處罰措施。
The fight between the two countries is cleaving the high-tech realm. The world’s two biggest
mistrustful of the other’s. Reconciliation looks difficult. And the rising tensions could further
undercutAmerican influence in a huge and fast-changing market.
這兩個國家之間的鬥爭正在讓高科技領域一分為二。作為全球最大的兩個經濟體，它們都看緊
了各自的前沿行業，並且不信任對方。和解看上去很難。並且日漸升級的緊張局勢可能會進一
步削弱美國在一個巨大且迅速變化的市場的影響力。
Both sides have been putting up defensive walls for years.
多年來雙方一直在修築防禦墻。
To stay in business in China, Apple has had to set up a data center there to store Chinese customers’
personal information. Amazon recently had to sell equipment to its Chinese cloud services partner to
comply with new Chinese rules. Facebook and Twitter are blocked in the country; newer American
players, such as Snap, are not even trying to enter anymore.
為了留在中國做生意，蘋果(Apple)不得不在中國設立數據中心，用於存儲中國客戶的個人信
息。前不久，為了遵守中國的新規，亞馬遜(Amazon)不得不將設備賣給中國雲服務合作夥伴。
Facebook和Twitter在中國被屏蔽，像Snap這樣新湧現的美國勢力甚至不再嘗試進入中國市場。
In the United States, regulators have repeatedly thwarted attempts by Chinese tech groups to acquire
American firms. And espionage concerns have for years kept Huawei — one of the world’s biggest
suppliers of telecom gear, and a powerhouse of China’s tech scene — largely out of the American
market.
在美國，監管機構一再阻撓中國科技團體收購美國公司的嘗試。而出於對間諜活動的擔憂，全
球最大的電信設備供應商之一、中國科技巨頭華為，多年來基本上被美國市場拒之門外。
The Trump administration says it wants to level the playing field, dishing out to Chinese companies
the kind of treatment thatAmerican ones have been receiving in China for some time.
特朗普政府說它想創造公平的競爭環境，用多年來中國對待美國公司的方式來對付中國公司。
“China’s abilities and ambitions have shifted much further up the value-added chain, to tech that
represents our crown jewels economically and that is relevant for national security,” said Scott
Kennedy, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “So there’s no
way to kick this can down the road anymore.”
“中國的能力和目標在增值鏈上進一步上移，抵達了代表我們的經濟最高成就且關乎國家安全
的技術，”華盛頓國際戰略研究中心(Center for Strategic and International Studies)的研究員斯科
特·肯尼迪(Scott Kennedy)說。“所以不能再拖延下去了。”
Still, as much as American companies complain about how they are treated in China, it could get
even worse if Beijing amplifies its retaliation beyond the tariffs, announced Friday, on $3 billion
worth of goods.
盡管美國公司抱怨自己在中國的遭遇，但如果北京在周五宣布對價值 30 億美元的商品加征關
稅的基礎上擴大報復範圍，情況甚至會更糟。
China could require that foreign tech companies undergo costly additional tests for new products, or
simply make it more difficult to operate in the country. Apple, whose iPhones remain coveted among
well-off Chinese, made nearly $18 billion in the country in the last quarter of 2017. Qualcomm, the
San Diego microchip maker, has earned half its revenue in China in recent years.
中國可能會要求外國科技公司對新產品進行代價不菲的額外測試，或僅僅是增加在中國開展業
務的難度。蘋果 2017 年最後一個季度在中國賺了近 180 億美元，它旗下的 iPhone 依然頗受中
國富裕人群的青睞。聖叠戈微芯片制造商高通(Qualcomm)近年來一半的收入來自中國。
It could also devise new regulatory hoops for foreign companies to jump through. China’s Ministry
of Commerce has not yet approved Qualcomm’s proposed, $44 billion purchase of NXP
Semiconductors, a Dutch chip maker. The deal, more than a year in the making, needs a signoff from
Chinese antitrust authorities because the two companies count a large number of electronics makers
in China as customers.
它還可以為外國公司設置新的監管障礙。中國商務部尚未批準高通提出的 440 億美元收購荷蘭
芯片制造商 NXP 半導體(NXP Semiconductors)的計劃。由於中國大量電子設備制造商是這兩家
公司的客戶，已醞釀一年多的該交易需得到中國反壟斷機構的同意。
Both countries’efforts to kneecap each other’s tech champions are as much about national security as
economic might. Likewise with the race to dominate frontier fields such as artificial intelligence,
quantum computing and next-generation wireless internet. Mr. Trump recently blocked a hostile bid
by Broadcom to buy Qualcomm. He did so not because the bidder was Chinese — Broadcom is
headquartered in Singapore — but because the administration said the deal would weaken
Qualcomm, leaving Huawei with a stronger hand to shape 5G, or fifth-generation mobile technology.
但兩國打擊對方科技領軍勢力的行動既是為了國家安全，也是為了經濟實力。和在爭奪人工智
能、量子計算和下一代無線互聯網等前沿領域主導地位的競賽中一樣，特朗普最近叫停了博通
(Broadcom)對高通(Qualcomm)發起的惡意收購。他這麽做不是因為發起收購方是中國人——博
通總部設在新加坡——而是因為特朗普政府說該交易會削弱高通，讓華為塑造 5G 即第五代移
動技術的實力增強。
This is why the present tensions are so difficult to resolve. In a previous era, Japan was a
technological rival but a military ally. The Soviet Union was a tech rival in defense, though a laggard
in the commercial sphere.
這就是為什麽目前的緊張局勢難以化解的原因。以前，日本在科技上是競爭對手，但在軍事上
是盟友。蘇聯在國防科技上是對手，但在商業領域落後。
“The U.S. and China have so intertwined their science and technology systems through trade and
investment and cooperative research — but see each other, and continue to see each other, as
strategic competitors and adversaries,” said Adam Segal, a tech and security expert at the Council on
Foreign Relations. “That hasn’t happened before.”
“在貿易、投資以及合作研究中，美國和中國的科學和技術體系聯系得是如此密切——但他們
都將對方視為——且會一直視為——戰略對手和敵人，”外交關系委員會(Council on Foreign
Relations)技術和安全專家亞當·謝加爾(Adam Segal)說。“這之前從未有過。”
China’s angst about foreign tech dominance runs deep.
中國對外國科技的主導地位懷著十分深切的擔憂。
For most of the past decade, Beijing has blocked many American internet services, including
Facebook’s and Google’s, to control the flow of information and head off social media-fueled
movements such as theArab Spring.
過去十年內的大部分時間，北京一直屏蔽包括Facebook 和Google在內的許多美國互聯網服務，
以控制信息流，避免“阿拉伯之春”那樣由社交媒體助力的運動。
Another great paroxysm of worry came in 2013, when Edward J. Snowden leaked
documents showing ties between American technology providers and the National Security Agency’s
vast surveillance program.
2013 年，愛德華·J·斯諾登(Edward J. Snowden)披露的文件顯示了美國技術服務商與美國國家安
全局廣泛監控計劃之間的聯系，又引發了另一波擔憂。
For China, “one of the major takeaways was, ‘We are overly reliant on American technology over
which we have very little control,’” said Rogier Creemers, a scholar of Chinese tech policy at Leiden
University in the Netherlands.
對中國而言，“學到的最重要一點是，‘對於那些我們幾乎無力控制的技術，我們過度依賴美國
了，’”荷蘭萊頓大學(Leiden University)研究中國科技政策的學者羅吉爾·克裏米爾斯(Rogier
Creemers)說。
新冷戰時代：中美高科技領域主導權之爭
For the U.S. and China, a Technology Cold War That’s Freezing Over
Acold war is being waged across the world’s most advanced industries. And it just got a lot chillier.
全球最先進的行業陷入了一場冷戰。並且這場冷戰比上一場冷多了。
Recent tit-for-tat trade actions could deepen what has become a global contest for technological
users and a flourishing community of start-ups and innovative companies.
最近出現的針鋒相對的貿易行動，可能會加劇美國和中國對科技主導地位所展開的全球爭奪。
中國的互聯網用戶人數全球最多，而且創業和創新企業群體蓬勃發展。
The Trump administration this week accused Beijing of stealing valuable technological know-how
Chinese investments. China responded with its own set of penalties aimed at American products.
本周，特朗普政府在提議對價值 600 億美元（約合 3800 億元人民幣）的中國商品征收關稅並
限制中國的投資時，指責北京從美國公司竊取寶貴的核心技術。中國做出反擊，針對美國產品
也拿出了一系列處罰措施。
The fight between the two countries is cleaving the high-tech realm. The world’s two biggest
mistrustful of the other’s. Reconciliation looks difficult. And the rising tensions could further
undercutAmerican influence in a huge and fast-changing market.
這兩個國家之間的鬥爭正在讓高科技領域一分為二。作為全球最大的兩個經濟體，它們都看緊
了各自的前沿行業，並且不信任對方。和解看上去很難。並且日漸升級的緊張局勢可能會進一
步削弱美國在一個巨大且迅速變化的市場的影響力。
Both sides have been putting up defensive walls for years.
多年來雙方一直在修築防禦墻。
To stay in business in China, Apple has had to set up a data center there to store Chinese customers’
personal information. Amazon recently had to sell equipment to its Chinese cloud services partner to
comply with new Chinese rules. Facebook and Twitter are blocked in the country; newer American
players, such as Snap, are not even trying to enter anymore.
為了留在中國做生意，蘋果(Apple)不得不在中國設立數據中心，用於存儲中國客戶的個人信
息。前不久，為了遵守中國的新規，亞馬遜(Amazon)不得不將設備賣給中國雲服務合作夥伴。
Facebook和Twitter在中國被屏蔽，像Snap這樣新湧現的美國勢力甚至不再嘗試進入中國市場。
In the United States, regulators have repeatedly thwarted attempts by Chinese tech groups to acquire
American firms. And espionage concerns have for years kept Huawei — one of the world’s biggest
suppliers of telecom gear, and a powerhouse of China’s tech scene — largely out of the American
market.
在美國，監管機構一再阻撓中國科技團體收購美國公司的嘗試。而出於對間諜活動的擔憂，全
球最大的電信設備供應商之一、中國科技巨頭華為，多年來基本上被美國市場拒之門外。
The Trump administration says it wants to level the playing field, dishing out to Chinese companies
the kind of treatment thatAmerican ones have been receiving in China for some time.
特朗普政府說它想創造公平的競爭環境，用多年來中國對待美國公司的方式來對付中國公司。
“China’s abilities and ambitions have shifted much further up the value-added chain, to tech that
represents our crown jewels economically and that is relevant for national security,” said Scott
Kennedy, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “So there’s no
way to kick this can down the road anymore.”
“中國的能力和目標在增值鏈上進一步上移，抵達了代表我們的經濟最高成就且關乎國家安全
的技術，”華盛頓國際戰略研究中心(Center for Strategic and International Studies)的研究員斯科
特·肯尼迪(Scott Kennedy)說。“所以不能再拖延下去了。”
Still, as much as American companies complain about how they are treated in China, it could get
even worse if Beijing amplifies its retaliation beyond the tariffs, announced Friday, on $3 billion
worth of goods.
盡管美國公司抱怨自己在中國的遭遇，但如果北京在周五宣布對價值 30 億美元的商品加征關
稅的基礎上擴大報復範圍，情況甚至會更糟。
China could require that foreign tech companies undergo costly additional tests for new products, or
simply make it more difficult to operate in the country. Apple, whose iPhones remain coveted among
well-off Chinese, made nearly $18 billion in the country in the last quarter of 2017. Qualcomm, the
San Diego microchip maker, has earned half its revenue in China in recent years.
中國可能會要求外國科技公司對新產品進行代價不菲的額外測試，或僅僅是增加在中國開展業
務的難度。蘋果 2017 年最後一個季度在中國賺了近 180 億美元，它旗下的 iPhone 依然頗受中
國富裕人群的青睞。聖叠戈微芯片制造商高通(Qualcomm)近年來一半的收入來自中國。
It could also devise new regulatory hoops for foreign companies to jump through. China’s Ministry
of Commerce has not yet approved Qualcomm’s proposed, $44 billion purchase of NXP
Semiconductors, a Dutch chip maker. The deal, more than a year in the making, needs a signoff from
Chinese antitrust authorities because the two companies count a large number of electronics makers
in China as customers.
它還可以為外國公司設置新的監管障礙。中國商務部尚未批準高通提出的 440 億美元收購荷蘭
芯片制造商 NXP 半導體(NXP Semiconductors)的計劃。由於中國大量電子設備制造商是這兩家
公司的客戶，已醞釀一年多的該交易需得到中國反壟斷機構的同意。
Both countries’efforts to kneecap each other’s tech champions are as much about national security as
economic might. Likewise with the race to dominate frontier fields such as artificial intelligence,
quantum computing and next-generation wireless internet. Mr. Trump recently blocked a hostile bid
by Broadcom to buy Qualcomm. He did so not because the bidder was Chinese — Broadcom is
headquartered in Singapore — but because the administration said the deal would weaken
Qualcomm, leaving Huawei with a stronger hand to shape 5G, or fifth-generation mobile technology.
但兩國打擊對方科技領軍勢力的行動既是為了國家安全，也是為了經濟實力。和在爭奪人工智
能、量子計算和下一代無線互聯網等前沿領域主導地位的競賽中一樣，特朗普最近叫停了博通
(Broadcom)對高通(Qualcomm)發起的惡意收購。他這麽做不是因為發起收購方是中國人——博
通總部設在新加坡——而是因為特朗普政府說該交易會削弱高通，讓華為塑造 5G 即第五代移
動技術的實力增強。
This is why the present tensions are so difficult to resolve. In a previous era, Japan was a
technological rival but a military ally. The Soviet Union was a tech rival in defense, though a laggard
in the commercial sphere.
這就是為什麽目前的緊張局勢難以化解的原因。以前，日本在科技上是競爭對手，但在軍事上
是盟友。蘇聯在國防科技上是對手，但在商業領域落後。
“The U.S. and China have so intertwined their science and technology systems through trade and
investment and cooperative research — but see each other, and continue to see each other, as
strategic competitors and adversaries,” said Adam Segal, a tech and security expert at the Council on
Foreign Relations. “That hasn’t happened before.”
“在貿易、投資以及合作研究中，美國和中國的科學和技術體系聯系得是如此密切——但他們
都將對方視為——且會一直視為——戰略對手和敵人，”外交關系委員會(Council on Foreign
Relations)技術和安全專家亞當·謝加爾(Adam Segal)說。“這之前從未有過。”
China’s angst about foreign tech dominance runs deep.
中國對外國科技的主導地位懷著十分深切的擔憂。
For most of the past decade, Beijing has blocked many American internet services, including
Facebook’s and Google’s, to control the flow of information and head off social media-fueled
movements such as theArab Spring.
過去十年內的大部分時間，北京一直屏蔽包括Facebook 和Google在內的許多美國互聯網服務，
以控制信息流，避免“阿拉伯之春”那樣由社交媒體助力的運動。
Another great paroxysm of worry came in 2013, when Edward J. Snowden leaked
documents showing ties between American technology providers and the National Security Agency’s
vast surveillance program.
2013 年，愛德華·J·斯諾登(Edward J. Snowden)披露的文件顯示了美國技術服務商與美國國家安
全局廣泛監控計劃之間的聯系，又引發了另一波擔憂。
For China, “one of the major takeaways was, ‘We are overly reliant on American technology over
which we have very little control,’” said Rogier Creemers, a scholar of Chinese tech policy at Leiden
University in the Netherlands.
對中國而言，“學到的最重要一點是，‘對於那些我們幾乎無力控制的技術，我們過度依賴美國
了，’”荷蘭萊頓大學(Leiden University)研究中國科技政策的學者羅吉爾·克裏米爾斯(Rogier
Creemers)說。
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